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Illustrations
Moreover, the Air Force has requested another $17 billion for operations supporting the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 1 However, even this amount is not enough. The Air Force needs more funds to modernize and recapitalize its aging fleet. Many aircraft have long passed their intended lifespan. For example, the average age of the KC-135E Stratotanker is 48 years old and the B-52H Stratofortress is 45 years old. 2 Operational and budgetary pressures further hinder the modernization and recapitalization effort. Fiscal pressures include rising operating costs (e.g. personnel and energy resources) and cutthroat interservice competition for defense funds.
Operational pressures include funding new weapon systems, assuming new missions and sustaining current mission requirements. These pressures stress an already constrained budget.
These budget problems are basic Economics 101. The Air Force has "x" amount of dollars to pay for "y" amount of goods and services. If the need for "y" is greater than "x," then the reduction of expenses and fiscal obligations are the only ways to generate the necessary savings. Moseley, "our strategy will be a comprehensive effort to improve our work processes across our Air Force." 3 This is a fundamental shift, by the Air Force, toward a desired end state of continuous process improvement.
AFSO 21 incorporates many different types of process improvement models such as Lean,
Six Sigma and the Theory of Constraints. According to the Director of the AFSO 21 office, Brigadier General S. Gilbert, the intent is to build a tool kit with a variety of tools that are flexible enough to apply across many areas. 4 The Air Force is emphasizing Lean because "Lean has an infectious quality [with] quick, visible results that cause natural replication." 
A Journey Across the "Unknown" State
Organizational "change is a dynamic process, rather than a series of events." 7 Human nature tends to gravitate toward the path of least resistance. The tendency is to believe that very simple answers will handle the complex problems we face. However, change requires more than simply redrawing an organizational chart. It is active and is in constant motion. Change is relentlessly creating a new crisis or challenge. This dynamic process requires an organization to continuously monitor and adjust their activities accordingly. As the rate of change fluctuates, leadership and followers must adapt to it. Failing to adapt, can lead to a slowdown or discontinuation of the change effort.
Current State

Desired State Gap (Unknown State)
AU/ACSC/2307/AY07 Another way to frame change is by looking at it from a different perspective. Organizational change occurs when an organization realizes there is a significant gap between its current environment and its desired environment. This unknown state is a foreign and mysterious place.
Change occurs when an organization closes this gap (see Figure 1 ).
Current State
Desired State Gap (Unknown State) Figure 1 "Failure to close this gap…that is, the failure to change-will spell doom for the organization." 8 Closing this gap is difficult.
The trek across the unknown state is an unfamiliar journey (or at least for the people in the organization). After all, the people must endure the process. Involving the human aspect injects a host of other complications such as emotions. According to Jeanie Duck, "changing an organization is inherently and inescapably an emotional human process." 9 This emotional process may include uncertainty, fear and excitement. As we will discover in later chapters, the introduction of the human aspect further complicates the change effort.
Thus, an organization's change effort is dependant upon discovering the best way(s) to close this gap. Random unplanned forays, for closing the gap, are discouraged because it is easy to become lost, overwhelmed and discouraged. This "close the gap" endeavor requires a broad plan of action focused on the long-term. The journey will be long, but successfully changing an organization is dependant upon reaching the end state.
Change Process
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How to Change (and How Not to Change)
Once an organization realizes it must change, the next step is determining how to change.
There are a number of drivers and barriers for change. Jeanie Duck frames change efforts into three essential elements: true transformation of an organization requires leadership and all its trappings. However, these steps are not as simple. An organization will transition through the steps at different speedssometimes fast, but most often, slow.
Moving through these steps is complicated and time consuming-it can take years.
According to Kotter, this is where trouble begins with the change initiative. These long periods are "incomprehensible to short-term, reactive managers." As a result, they are more likely to make a critical mistake in one of the steps, which "can have a devastating impact, slowing 
Systems Thinking Approach
The significant problems we have cannot be solved at the same level of thinking with which we created them.
─Albert Einstein
The Air Force is a large, complex organization; thereby making it a challenge to grasp and understand its many interdependent components. The systems thinking approach provides a structure for visualizing the organization as interrelationships and not just separate parts. This chapter will utilize the systems thinking approach to identify potential failure points in changing the Air Force culture to one of continuous process improvement. Note: The intent of this paper is not to fully utilize the systems thinking processes of loops and links, diagnostics, systems archetypes or computer modeling. It simply uses systems thinking to conceptualize the Air Force and its components to identify potential failure points in the change initiative. However, before examining the various components, it is important to discuss systems thinking.
What is Systems Thinking?
Systems thinking is a process for looking at the whole and not its parts. It is a concept popularized by Peter Senge. In his book, The Fifth Discipline, Senge suggests that, "systems thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes, recognizing patterns and interrelationships, and learning how to structure those interrelationships in more effective, efficient ways." 15 In other words, to spin an old country saying, it is seeing the forest and not just the trees. As an illustration, consider the composition of an automobile. It consists of thousands of individual parts that connect to form a large, complex system. In addition, there are smaller sub-systems such as electrical, brake and fuel systems. Each part directly or indirectly affects the operation of the automobile. (The key concept is that each part, no matter the size or importance, has a central role in the system.) However, if there is a problem, the complexity of the automobile makes it difficult to determine which part is failing (or has failed). The systems thinking approach allows the mechanic to see the interrelationships rather than parts. This approach is useful in troubleshooting because it eliminates the mayhem under the hood. In his book, Systems
Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity, Jamshid Gharajedaghi submits that systems thinking provides "a holistic picture that will allow us to see through chaos and understand complexity." 16 In essence, systems thinking is an excellent way to view change because it focuses not on the individual component but rather the big picture. This is very useful when examining large, complex organizations like the Air Force. Systems thinking "organizes complexity into a coherent story that illuminates the causes of problems and how they can be remedied in enduring ways." 17 Understanding the system as a whole enables you to predict, influence or control its behavior.
Interrelationships Take Time
Changes to a system do not occur over night. It takes time to make holistic changes due to processes, linkages and interactions between the components; these are complex and dynamic interrelationships. "Very often, people expect improvements too soon after changes are
implemented." 18 This may explain why long-term change efforts sometimes fail in organizations. In some cases of failure, a frequent mistake is overlooking these interrelationships. It is important to remember that changing or ignoring one part of a system can have consequences elsewhere. This is even more apparent when one considers that organizations do not operate in a vacuum; they interact with both internal and external environments. The level of these interactions varies between simple and complex relationships.
Therefore, leaders need a tool to distinguish processes, patterns and relationships from events.
Just Like Tires -Alignment and Balance Matters
"Systems thinking is a useful tool to initiate organizational change and continuous improvement." 19 Michael Beer provides an organizational change model for leaders 20 He believes "one of the keys to successful organizational change is ensuring that all components in Figure [ 4] are in alignment." 21 In other words, no one component is an island; all components must work in unison to achieve the desired change. However, there is a difference in the amount of time and energy invested in each component. Organizations must find the appropriate balance. "Any imbalance diminishes the system's ability to effectively accomplish its purpose and causes conflict within the system." 22 The following chapters utilize Beer's systems model to identify potential points of failure to sustaining AFSO 21 and its culture of continuous process improvement. This is important because change failures often occur when only addressing one part of a larger complex system.
As a result, an organization focuses on the symptom and not the problem. This focus on a short term symptom fails to address the long-term problem, thus, the energy and resources directed at it will not create a culture of continuous process improvement. " [Culture] does not stand alone;
it must operate effectively (in balance) with other parts for the system to accomplish its purpose." 23 The sustainment of a long-term program demands that, "no area of the organization can be off-limits or protected." 24 Because of this, the Air Force must be willing to address the long-term problems of change resistance and not just the symptoms. we must fundamentally change the culture of our Air Force so that all Airmen understand their individual role in improving their daily processes and eliminating things that don't add value to the mission. 25 Organizational culture is a mystifying thing. How else does one explain how a deftly constructed strategy can fail when employees do not "buy-in" to it? After all, is strategy not the driver for action? On the contrary, does culture drive how effectively people work together? For instance, an organization's strategy is to increase efficiencies across the organization. However, if its culture is one where people get the job done at any cost, then the disparity between the strategy and the culture could be impossible to achieve. The challenge for organizations is overcoming these differences in order to sustain a long-term change. Hence, an important aspect to organizational change is the understanding of how to change culture while keeping it in alignment with the plan. 
More than the Culture
According to Hughes, "a common mistake for many leaders is to change the organization's vision, structure, and systems and overlook the organization's culture and leader and follower
capabilities." 31 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, equally important to changing culture is changing the other parts of the system. Leadership may avoid a culture change failure if it addresses potential failure points before they fester and take root. Therefore, a potential failure point for sustaining AFSO 21 is focusing only on the culture and thus creating an unbalanced system.
Potential Failure Point # 2: Inflexible Structure
You do need to put people into a new organizational context that creates new roles, responsibilities, and relationships if you are to affect their behavior. 32 ─Bill Creech Jack Welch, the former CEO of General Electric (GE), is famous for restructuring GE and instilling a process improvement culture. He is a firm believer in a decentralized approach to organization. In his book, Jack, Welch predicts, "hierarchy is dead. The organization of the future will be virtually layerless and increasingly boundaryless, a series of information networks in which more electrons and fewer people will manage processes." 33 Does the Air Force's current organizational structure support the idea of continuous process improvement? If not, can it change? Alternatively, will the autocratic hierarchy, which defines the Air Force, become a potential failure point? The answer for both of these questions is "it depends." As a result, the structure, or its inflexibility, is an AFSO 21 potential failure point.
Combat vs. Business
The 
Is the Zenith Good Enough?
The Air Force understands its mission; they do it well. Nevertheless, due to its unique mission of defending the United States, the Air Force cannot divest of the "business" side. It needs to keep the "business" side because there is no other viable option for supplying and maintaining combat systems and infrastructure. However, every few years, some of the "business" side divests via outsourcing. In addition, the Air Force is slowly changing to reflect its new "flattening" position:
Organizations must encourage rapid decision making, so they should be flat structures without immediate levels, unless mission requirements cannot otherwise be met…Both the number of supervisors and the number of internal subdivisions within organizations should be designed to minimize layers and maximize worker-to-supervisor ratios.
However, this effort is not one of active encouragement; it will not make a significant difference. The root problem is that the Air Force does not know who it is today (Dr Jekyll) or who it will be tomorrow (Mr. Hyde). As a result, the Air Force's bipolar disorder will prevent a substantial change in structure. Although, the Air Force will make minor structural changes, this tweaking and massaging will only support short-term results. This struggle between "Jekyll" and "Hyde" will allow only minimal movement up and down the efficiency spectrum (See Figure 6 ). 
Efficiency Spectrum Efficiency Spectrum
Figure 6
The centralized spectrum is a traditional hierarchy structure, while the decentralized end of the spectrum is flat. The ability and capability for continuous process improvement resides in the decentralized spectrum. The minimal movement on the spectrum is because of both personalities Therefore, the Air Force's desire for establishing and sustaining a continuous process improvement organization will stop short of "true" efficiency. Its zenith will reside somewhere in between the two ends of the spectrum. Will the efficiency zenith be good enough?
Consequently, the inflexibility of the Air Force structure is a potential failure point for AFSO 21.
Potential Failure Point # 3: HRM Systems
Don't fight the system. Change the rules and the system will change itself. 43 ─Gene Bellinger
Organizations consist of many different types of systems. There are production systems, financial systems and supply systems to name a few. These systems are all vital to an organization's ability to operate. As an illustration, consider a maintenance process's interrelationship with the supply system. A process improvement team can "Lean" out an aircraft repair process so well that it makes one's eyes water. However, if the legacy supply system does not change, then that team may have a perfect process but they still must wait on the inefficient supply system. For this reason, systems must keep up with the changes undergoing elsewhere in the organization. Therefore, a potential failure point for sustaining AFSO 21 is the human resources management (HRM) system.
What about the People?
"The key to an effective organization is to align the structure with strategy and at the same time to design high commitment human resource policies and practices." 44 People manage and operate an organization. In other words, human resources are the core of an organization.
Hence, when trying to change the organization's culture, systems should be a primary consideration in the strategic planning phase. Systems serve to develop and reinforce organizational culture. With this in mind, will the Air Force pay attention to the HRM system. CONOPS emphasizes the "use of our greatest resource…our innovative, dedicated Airmen." 45 Consequently, where is the emphasis on HRM systems? These systems help guide and shape
Airmen's behavior. This chapter will address two key areas of HRM that enable the sustainment of a continuous process improvement culture. They are incentives and staffing.
Wrong People off the Bus
The Air Force is trying to rationally appeal to its employees by informing and educating them on the importance of a continuous process improvement culture. Articles and messages crying that the "fiscal sky" is falling have bombarded airmen. The problem with this approach is that, in most cases, these budgetary constraints have not affected Airmen at their local operating level.
Therefore, saving the Air Force programmed money is not an attractive selling point. It does not answer the question of "what is in it for me and why should I care?" However, HRM practices and polices directly affect Airmen. Michael Beer articulates that, "decisions about human resource policies affect levels of employee commitment." 46 The two most attractive incentive areas for policy adjustment are promotions and evaluations.
The day continuous process improvement becomes officially part of the promotion and evaluation process is the day people start taking AFSO 21 seriously. Airmen will need to know that their evaluations, promotions and appraisal bonuses are dependant on having significant amounts of continuous process improvement in their respective areas of responsibility.
Consider the promotion process and the mixed signals that it is currently sending Airmen.
The promotion process should favor Airmen who are most concerned with group improvement.
However, the current system does not favor this approach. According to Gene Bellinger, current promotion processes focus individuals on individual performance rather than the team. "One of the most prevalent of these mixed messages comes from management continuing to talk about the benefits of a team based operation, while still performing individual performance appraisals." 47 The 
Generation TQM
Cynicism is "an attitude of scornful or jaded negativity, especially a general distrust of the integrity or professed motives of others." 51 Mention "quality" to a mid-level officer and watch him or her roll their eyes. After all, today's mid-level officers cut their Air Force teeth on TQM.
Thus, this paper coined the term Generation TQM to describe them. The term, Generation TQM, The result…was cynicism by employees who saw inconsistencies between management's espoused TQM direction and the reality of superficial change. 'This too will pass,' was one of the most frequent responses to new programs, an indication of low commitment, an essential ingredient for fundamental change. 55 Why should they think anything different of AFSO 21?
Once a Cynic, Always a Cynic
The Air Force is in a tough position with mid-level officers. These officers are the gas that makes the Air Force operate. "They are the backbone…our aces-in-the-hole for the long war.
[They] have a passion to fight to win. [The Air Force] went through a period in the decade of the 90s where the Air Force lost some of its character as an institution. We once had a quality Air Force that was ruined by a concept known as Quality Air Force. We were told to believe that big business had all the answers…Words like empowerment, break down barriers. We stopped mentoring our people. We lost touch with the fine art of chewing ass. 58 The balancing of the other systems parts may hold the key to "winning" over the mid-level officer cynics. General (Retired) Bill Creech believed "you must change the organization conceptually and structurally to bring leadership alive at all levels." 59 Changing the HRM system and the structure may demonstrate that senior leadership really means action instead of rhetoric. If senior leaders:
Want to ensure that [AFSO 21] practices are sustained over time, they will have to consider requiring all [mid-level officers] to lead a regular process of organizational learning from which they also can learn. This will of course, place demands on them to engage in a similar process at the top. It will be the loudest and most believable signal that senior management is serious about creating a [continuous process improvement] culture. 60 The above quote originally discussed TQM; however, Beer's insights are just as applicable to Kennedy's moon speech.
Kennedy's call to "put a man on the moon by the end of the decade" is a classic vision statement-clear, short, compelling, broad enough for all to contribute, and with an emotional hook that motivates. 62 On the other hand, a blurry or absent vision spells certain doom to a change effort. Without a vision, will the organization reach its desired end state? How will the employees sustain their drive for excellence? Proverbs conveys the importance of vision, "Where there is no vision, the people perish" (Prov. 29.18). Hence, a poor or blurry vision is almost as ineffective as not having one at all, because it can de-motivate and confuse the organization. These ill-effects make it difficult for employees to maintain their drive, passion and resolve toward the change effort. As a result, change initiatives will often fail due to these shortcomings. John Kotter has asserted that in "failed transformations, you often find plenty of plans and directives and programs, but no vision" 63 True to military form, the Air Force has a plethora of plans and directives for AFSO 21. Conversely, has the Air Force met the vision component requirement?
A Vision or Not
There are a couple of ways to answer this question. there are many potential weak spots, which may shift the balance between system components.
As a result, misaligned components may eventually erode the AFSO 21 foundation.
Therefore, an effective change plan needs to address components other than just culture. It is the interrelationships between the various parts of the system that gives it strength and longevity.
Upon reviewing key AFSO 21 program documents (e.g. CONOPS, Implementation Plan and White Paper), it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 21. There is no mention or discussion about structure or systems. This omission may indicate that the focus is on the short-term and not a long view. In addition, there is no substantial discussion on vision or "winning" over mid-level officers. Once again, it appears the Air Force is proceeding with a "mandate"; thus, the goal is quick wins without sufficiently planning for the long-term.
This paper identified several potential failure points for senior leadership to address. These failure points are observations and not criticisms of the AFSO 21 implementation. There is still time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the system's alignment and put AFSO 21 on track for a long-term sustainment. However, the journey toward establishing this new culture is difficult. According to Jack Welch, a culture change requires dedication and perseverance:
Even with my constant cheerleading and a lot of pounding, it took us three years to get all the best people into Six Sigma.
70
Making initiatives successful is all about focus and passionate commitment. The drumbeat must be relentless. Every leadership action must demonstrate total commitment to the initiative. 71 The philosophy and principles behind AFSO 21 are sound. A culture of continuous process improvement will take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to AFSO 21. Major Kenneth R. Theriot's view on quality is just as appropriate now for AFSO 21 as it was for TQM.
When leadership commits its resources to all aspects of process improvement, and where a continuous improvement-friendly culture is established and nurtured, AFSO 21 will succeed. shifting how you think?
